[Digest] Caniete vs. Secretary of Education (2000)

CANIETE  vs. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS [G.R. No. 140359. June 19, 2000]  KAPUNAN, J.:

·         Herman Caniete and Wilfredo Rosario are public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong HS QC. For being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990, they were charged by Secretary Isidro Cariño, then Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, with alleged participation in the mass actions/strikes on said dates. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension on 21 September 1990. --> eventually found guilty --> dismissed from service  --> MSPB REVERSED: Suspend only for 3m without pay -->CSC modified penalty: REPRIMAND ONLY --> found that petitioners were only guilty of being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990 without the necessary leave of absence, and not as charged by Secretary Cariño of participating in the mass actions/strikes on said dates.  -->They are automatically reinstated in the service without payment of back salaries.

·         Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the CSC resolution insofar as it disallowed the payment of their back salaries. --> DENIED

ISSUE: WON PETS ARE ENTITLED TO BACK SALARIES UPON THEIR REINSTATEMENT (after they were found guilty only of violating reasonable office rules and regulations and penalized only with reprimand)? YES!

·         Citing  Gloria vs. CA - the public school teachers therein were either suspended or dismissed for allegedly participating in the strikes sometime in September and October 1990. They were eventually exonerated of said charge and found guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of absence. Thus, the penalty of dismissal earlier imposed on them was reduced to reprimand and their reinstatement was ordered. Moreover, this Court affirmed the payment of back salaries of said teachers explaining that although "employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent."

·         Thus, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (§51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (§47[4]).

·         Employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to compensation because such suspension "is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation."^[7] Upon the other hand, there is right to compensation for preventive suspension pending appeal if the employee is eventually exonerated. This is because "preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension."

·         In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, a public school teacher who was found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for having been absent without leave and reprimanded was given back salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the strikes.

·         Given the substantial factual similarities of this case to Gloria, there is clearly no reason for this Court to rule against the payment of back salaries to herein petitioners.

[Digest] Segovia vs. Noel (1925)

VICENTE SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee, vs. PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant. (G.R. No. L-23226 March 4, 1925 |MALCOLM)

FACTS:

·         Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He continuously occupied this position until having passed 65yo, he was ordered by the Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.

·         Mr. Segovia instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI of Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug. To this complaint, Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to be justice of the peace è SEGOVIA WON

ISSUE: whether that portion of Act No. 3107 (1923) which provides, that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached 65 yo, should be given retroactive or prospective effect. NO IT SHOULD  NOT

·         SEGOVIA è Section 1 of Act No. 3107 is unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of the petitioner to an office.

o    SC: It is a fundamental principle that a public office cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract.

·         ORIG LAW Section 67 of Act No. 136 à justices of the peace shall hold office during the pleasure of the Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente Segovia was originally appointed justice of the peace, amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making the term of office of justices and auxiliary justices of the peace two years from the first Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after Segovia's appointment, however, the law was again amended by Act No. 1627 by providing that "all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206 of the Administrative Code.

·         Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General for the City of Manila, the City of Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and municipal district in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests shall so require, for any other minor political division or unorganized territory in said Islands."

o    It was this section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof the following proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." But section 206 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice," was left unchanged by Act No. 3107.

·         A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. à a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code has it in article 3, "Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." (Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer vs. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306; Montilla vs. Agustinian Corporation [1913], 24 Phil., 220; In re will of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil., 23.)

o    The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known New York decision held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated." (People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another case, a new constitutional provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply to persons in office at the time of its taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Chap. XVII, particularly pages 1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 389.)

·         The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil., 329). In that case, the question was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under consideration not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further provided "that the present judges of Courts of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of First Instance ... ." There the intention of the Legislature to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Here, it is not expressed at all.

o    The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives no indication of retroactive effect.

·         In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.