[Digest] Ortigas vs. FEATI (1979)

ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTENRSHIP V. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO. (1979)

 Santos, J.

Facts:

·         Ortigas  & Co., Limited Partnership engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to the public particularly Highway Hills subdivision along EDSA

·         March 4, 1952 – Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over Lots 5 and 6 Block 31, Highway Hills

·         July 19, 1962 – Augusto and Natividad transferred their rights and interests in favor of Emma Chavez

o    Transfer contained the following restrictions and stipulations:

§  For residential purposes only

§  All buildings and improvements (except fences) should use strong building material, have modern sanitary installations connected to the public sewer or own septic tank and shall not be more than 2 meters from the boundary lines

·         Resolution 27 – Feb 4, 1960 – reclassified the western part of EDSA (Shaw boulevard to Pasig River) as a commercial and industrial zone

·         Such restrictions were annotated on the TCTs

·         July 23, 1962 - Feati bank bought Lot 5 from Emma Chavez while lot 6 was purchased by Republic Flour Mills

·         May 5, 1963 – Feati Bank began laying foundation and construction of a building for banking purposes on lots 5 and 6

·         Ortigas & Co. Demanded that they comply with the annotated restrictions

·         Feati Bank refused arguing that it was following the zoning regulations

·         Ortigas & Co. filed a case in the lower courts which held that Resolution No. 27 was a valid exercise of police power of the municipality hence the zoning is binding and takes precedence over the annotations in the TCTs because “private interest should bow down to general interest and welfare.”

·         March 2, 1965 – motion for reconsideration by Ortigas & Co. which was denied on March 26, 1965

·         April 2, 1965 Ortigas filed notice of appeal which was given due course on April 14, 1965 hence this case.

Issues:

WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power

WON Resolution No. 27 can nullify or supersede contractual obligations by Feati Bank and Trust Co.

Held:

YES it is a valid exercise police power.

YES it can nullify contractual obligations by Feati with Ortigas & Co.

Ratio:

·         The validity of the resolution was never assailed in the lower courts and can therefore not be raised for the first time on appeal

o    The rule against flip flopping issues and arguments prevents deception in courts

o    Ortigas & Co. also did not dispute the factual findings of the lower court on the validity of the resolution

·         Assuming arguendo it was properly raised the resolution is still valid

o    RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) Sec 3 empowers municipalities to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality

o    The resolution is regulatory measure!

o    RA 2264 Sec 12 à any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist à this gives more power to LGUs to promote general welfare, economic conditions, social welfare and material progress in their locality

·         The non-impairment clause of contracts is not absolute since it must be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power

o    when general welfare and private property rights clash, the former must prevail through police powers of the state

·         Lots 5 and 6 front EDSA and has become surrounded by industrial and commercial complexes

o    Development in the area has resulted in extreme noise and air pollution that is not conducive to health, safety and welfare of the would-be residents à justifies the usage by Feati Bank of the land for more reasonable purposes

Decision: Affirmed

Dissenting: Abad Santos, J.

·         Resolution 27 is valid because it has not yet been struck down but it is not a legitimate exercise of police power because its means (zoning) do not fit with its purpose of general welfare

·         Zoning the area as industrial and commercial will contribute to chaos, frenzy, pollution, noise which suffocate and cause the deterioration of the ecology à Lowers quality of life for residents in Metro Manila

[Digest] Bel-Air Association vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)

BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION V. IAC (1989)

  Sarmiento, J.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Before the Court are six consolidated petitions, docketed as G.R. nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, 82281 and 60727. The first five petitions for a motion for reconsideration raise the issue of whether Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents. Meanwhile, the last petition (G.R. 60727) raises the lone issue of whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic.

Facts

·         Ayala Corporation (original owner of the property subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air Village) executed a Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets to Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA).

·         Respondents allege that upon instructions of the Mayor of Makati, studies were made by the on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village.

o    Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic several village streets including Jupiter and Orbit streets.

·         Respondent’s claim: BAVA had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets and that the opening was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of police power.

·         Petitioner’s counter-argument: It has never agreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets. By virtue of its ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived without due process of law and without just compensation.

ISSUES/HOLDING

a.       W/N the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit streets? – YES

b.       If yes, what is the nature of the state power being invoked by the Mayor? – POLICE POWER

RATIO

a. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of Makati, in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets, had acted arbitrarily.

• Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation’s commercial section. Being considered as merely a boundary – and hence not part of Ayala’s real estate development projects – it cannot be said to have been for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air Village residents.
• The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corp. covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets, amongst others, effectively required both passageways open to the general public.

o    “…the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE (BAVA), their families, personnel, guests, domestic help and under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public…”

• As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.

b. The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept of police power.

o    The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets does not amount to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation – there is no taking of property involved.

o    Police power as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.”

o    Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

o    Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.

o    The exercise of police power, however, may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.

o    In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit and Jupiter streets was unjustified or that the Mayor acted unreasonably.

o    The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. The duty of local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of the minority.

DISPOSITIVE: Motion for reconsideration by Bel-Air Village Association is DENIED with FINALITY. The petition in G.R. 60727 is GRANTED. 

[Digest] People vs. Fajardo (1958)

PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (1958)

 Reyes, J.B.L.

Facts

 Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or repair of any building without a written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing.

1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardo’s son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardo’s private land, separated from public plaza by a creek.

 Jan. 16, 1954 – request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza.
o    Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.

 Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because they claimed that they needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residence

Feb. 26, 1954 – Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating Ordinance no. 7

o    CFI – Affirmed

o    CA forwarded the case to the SC because “the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.”

Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.

NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.

Ratio:

•      The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control the discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING IN THIS CASE.

o    Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny construction/repair permits

•         Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of general welfare

à Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, ‘the state may not under the guise of police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.’

o    IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the fact that they are built on private land are condemned by the ordinance à appellants constrained would be constrained to leave their land to idle without receiving just compensation for the virtual confiscation of their private land

•      Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative Code – Sec. 2243 – C – that municipal council shall have authority to exercise discretionary powers regarding establishing fire limits in populous centers à empowers municipal government to require construction/repair permits, to charge fees for such permits

o    IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely constructed in the public plaza.

[Digest] Lopez vs. CA (1970)

Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970)

Ponente: Fernando, J.

Facts:

o  January 1956 – Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle à Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to Manila

o    An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of the island which contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since Christmas of 1955.

o    Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila.

o    Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a “hoax” à the same word to be used by the newspapers who covered the same

o  January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write and food and clothing being scarce

o  January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazineà in the "January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz as “a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization.”  à Called it “Hoax of the year”

o  In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a different person of the same name à Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan

o    January 27, 1957 à published statements correcting their misprint and explained that confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13^th issue’s deadline

o  Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorney’s fees)

o  CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case

Issue:

o  WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in relation to the “hoax of the year”?

o    WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?

Held:

Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00

Ratio:

1.       Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.

o  Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui à libel is "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"  

o  Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel à "Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."

o    In this case à 3^rd person was Cruz à his picture being published beside the article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year

2.       Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim any talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations

o  State interest in press freedom à citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of good governance… “Public officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments on official acts”…”of course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the common good.”

o  So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to have and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.

o  “Last word on the subject” à Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy

o  Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values

o  TEST of LIABLITY à must prove there was actual malice in publishing the story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this case)

4.       Citing Concepcion, CJ. à Correction of error in publishing does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the original article

o  Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!

Dissent: Dizon, J.

o  Manila Chronicle should be absolved because:

o    No evidence of actual malice

o    The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral turpitude to Cruz

o    The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case should be considered “excusable negligence”

[Digest] US CASE - Clay vs. United States(1971) [The Muhammad Ali Case]

Clay v. United States

Per curiam.

Facts: 

·         In 1962, Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali) initially failed the US Armed Forces qualifying test because of subpar writing and spelling skills. However, upon the revision of the test in 1964, he was reclassified and deemed eligible for the draft and induction for the US Army on the occasion of the Vietnam War.  He filed for classification as a conscientious objector.

A conscientious objector is an "individual [who has] claimed the right to refuse to perform military service" on the grounds of freedom of thought, conscience, or religion.

·         The FBI then conducted an inquiry with the people who personally knew him, and the DOJ conducted a hearing for the purpose, taking the testimonies of his parents, his pastor, and the petitioner himself. The hearing officer gave a recommendation that the conscientious objector claim be sustained. Notwithstanding this, the DOJ wrote a letter to the State Appeal Board that his application be denied, which the Board eventually did, without a statement of the reasons for such denial.

·         The petitioner was eventually required to report for induction to the army.  However, upon having his name called, the petitioner refused to take the traditional step forward. As a result of this refusal, petitioner was charged and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction to the Armed Forces, which he is now appealing.

Issue:

WON the induction notice invalid because it was grounded upon an erroneous denial of his claim to be classified as a conscientious objector and, as a result, WON his conviction should be reversed.

Held/Ratio:

YES, the notice was invalid; therefore, the conviction should be reversed.

·         Three basic tests to qualify for the classification as a conscientious objector:

1.       He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form.

2.       He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief.

3.       He must show that this objection is sincere.

·         In applying these tests, the Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong. 

·         The alleged grounds for denial were sent through a recommendation by the DOJ to the Selective Service officials, who were in charge of approving or denying his application for conscientious-objector status.  The Government conceded that the two grounds the denial was based on were invalid, but argues that there is factual support for the third ground.

1.       Initially claiming that the basis for Clay’s refusal to be drafted rest on political and racial grounds, the Government eventually admitted that the petitioner’s claim was within the ‘religious training and belief' clause of the exemption provision, as his beliefs were founded on tenets of the Muslim religion as he understood them.

2.       The Government also previously stated that the registrant has not consistently overtly manifested his conscientious–objector claim, which is a requisite to establishing a subjective state of mind and belief; it claimed that the alleged beliefs were only manifested when military service became imminent.  However, the Government also eventually admitted to the sincerity of his beliefs, as found by the hearing officer assigned to his application.

3.       However, the Government maintains its position that there is a “basis in fact” for holding that petitioner is “not opposed to war in any form”, but only selectively opposed to certain wars.

·         The question of whether or not the tests were complied with, however, becomes irrelevant in light of the fact that no reasons were ever given to the petition for the denial of his application, as a result of which, it could not be determined which of the three grounds was relied on in order to deny his application.

[Digest] US CASE - Bradwell vs. Illinois (1873)

Bradwell v. State of Illinois (1873)

Mr. Justice Miller

Facts: Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied for a license to practice law in Illinois.  A state statute required a license obtained from two justices of the state supreme court to practice law. The Illinois Supreme Court denied her admission and held that as a married woman, she would not be bound in her contracts. The state supreme court’s opinion also held that the legislature never intended that women be admitted to the bar.

Issue: Can a qualified female citizen claim under the fourteenth amendment the privilege of practicing law?

Held: No. Judgment affirmed.

Ruling: The fourteenth amendment declares that citizens of the United States are citizens of the state where they reside. The protection designed by that clause has no application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of. If the plaintiff was a citizen of the state of Illinois, that provision of the Constitution gave her no protection against its courts or its legislation.

There are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, which a state is forbidden to abridge, but the right to admission to practice in the courts of a state is not one of them. This right does not depend on citizenship of the United States. As to the courts of a state, the right would relate to citizenship of the state. As to federal courts, it would relate to citizenship of the United States.

The right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a state is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to the federal government. Its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license.

[Digest] US CASE - US vs. SCRAP

US v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP[1]) et al

Ponente: Mr. Justice Stewart

Facts:

ú   December 13, 1971 substantially all railroads in the US requested authorization from the Interstate Commerce Commission to file 5 days’ notice of a 2.5% surcharge on nearly all freight rates.

ú   Railroads sought January 1, 1972 as the effective date for new rates

ú   According to Railroad companies: Surcharge is an emergency measure designed to produce $246M annually to meet the revenues that are going down and the costs that are going up.  They claim over $1B loss annually and more than $305M in increased wages alone.

ú   December 21, 1971- Commission acknowledged the need but thought that January 1, 1972 date ‘would preclude the public from effective participation.’ à authorized a refile of same surcharge with not less than 30 days’ surcharge and effective date of February 5, 1972

ú   January 5, 1972 – Railroads refiled but several parties protested.

Interested parties

Railroads

ú   Shippers, competing carriers and environmental groups (including SCRAP) protested surcharge, praying for 7-month statutory suspension period found under the Interstate Commerce Act. They claim: o    Economic, aesthetic and recreational harm to their members o    Discourage the use of recyclable materials à promote use of new raw materials that compete with scrap materials à bad for environment à forced to pay more for finished products o    Impaired use of forests and streams due to unnecessary destruction of timber and accumulation of more waste specifically in the Washington, DC area.

o         ‘since this was a general rate increase, recylcable materials would not be made any les competitive…that in the past general rate increases had not discouraged the movement of scrap materials.

ú   February 1, 1972 report by the commission held that ‘the involved general increase will have no significant adverse effect on the movement of traffic by railway or on the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy act of 1969

o    Surcharge is not suspended

o    April 24, 1972- ordered  the proposed selective increases filed by the carriers to be suspended for a full 7-month period ending November 30, 1972 and permitted the collection of the surcharge until that date

o    SCRAP FILED SUIT AS RESULT

Issues:

ú   Does SCRAP (and interveners) have standing?

ú   Can the court validly decide this issue without usurping the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the ICC by the Congress?

a.     Were ICC’s orders unlawful for failure to include a detailed environmental impact statement as required by National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Sec 102 (2) (C)?

Held:

ú   YES. Even thought economic harm was not sufficiently proved and the injuries claimed were not exactly specific to the petitioners due to the cross country coverage of the railroad system the court held that aesthetic and environmental well being are also important ingredients to the quality of life in a society. ‘The fact that the environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of judicial protection. They cited Association of Data Processing Service v. Camp and Barlow v. Collins in holding that standing can be granted when the ‘challenged action had caused injury in fact and where the alleged injury was to an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have violated.

ú   NO. The district court enjoined the ICC from ‘permitting’ the railroad surcharge due to an alleged implicit conferment of authority on federal courts due to the violation of the NEPA 1969’s procedural requirements. Citing Arrow the court held that courts are without jurisdiction over such an issue due to the exclusive power vested in the commission by the congress. To decide the issue is a direct interference with the commission’s discretionary decision whether or not to suspend the rates. Furthermore nowhere in the legislative history or the statutory language did the Congress imply such a grant of power that was already expressly taken away by SEC 15 (7) of the interstate commerce act. ‘To permit such judicial interference…would invite the very disruption’ of the system congress set up for orderly and lawful review of tariffs.

DECISION: REVERSED and REMANDED.

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[1] An unincorporated association formed by 5 law students to enhance the quality of the environment