Showing posts with label US CASE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US CASE. Show all posts

Sunday, March 16, 2014

[Digest] US CASE - Clay vs. United States(1971) [The Muhammad Ali Case]

Clay v. United States
Per curiam.



Facts: 
·         In 1962, Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali) initially failed the US Armed Forces qualifying test because of subpar writing and spelling skills. However, upon the revision of the test in 1964, he was reclassified and deemed eligible for the draft and induction for the US Army on the occasion of the Vietnam War.  He filed for classification as a conscientious objector.
A conscientious objector is an "individual [who has] claimed the right to refuse to perform military service" on the grounds of freedom of thought, conscience, or religion.
·         The FBI then conducted an inquiry with the people who personally knew him, and the DOJ conducted a hearing for the purpose, taking the testimonies of his parents, his pastor, and the petitioner himself. The hearing officer gave a recommendation that the conscientious objector claim be sustained. Notwithstanding this, the DOJ wrote a letter to the State Appeal Board that his application be denied, which the Board eventually did, without a statement of the reasons for such denial.
·         The petitioner was eventually required to report for induction to the army.  However, upon having his name called, the petitioner refused to take the traditional step forward. As a result of this refusal, petitioner was charged and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction to the Armed Forces, which he is now appealing.
Issue:
WON the induction notice invalid because it was grounded upon an erroneous denial of his claim to be classified as a conscientious objector and, as a result, WON his conviction should be reversed.

Held/Ratio:
YES, the notice was invalid; therefore, the conviction should be reversed.
·         Three basic tests to qualify for the classification as a conscientious objector:
1.       He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form.
2.       He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief.
3.       He must show that this objection is sincere.
·         In applying these tests, the Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong. 
·         The alleged grounds for denial were sent through a recommendation by the DOJ to the Selective Service officials, who were in charge of approving or denying his application for conscientious-objector status.  The Government conceded that the two grounds the denial was based on were invalid, but argues that there is factual support for the third ground.
1.       Initially claiming that the basis for Clay’s refusal to be drafted rest on political and racial grounds, the Government eventually admitted that the petitioner’s claim was within the ‘religious training and belief' clause of the exemption provision, as his beliefs were founded on tenets of the Muslim religion as he understood them.
2.       The Government also previously stated that the registrant has not consistently overtly manifested his conscientious–objector claim, which is a requisite to establishing a subjective state of mind and belief; it claimed that the alleged beliefs were only manifested when military service became imminent.  However, the Government also eventually admitted to the sincerity of his beliefs, as found by the hearing officer assigned to his application.
3.       However, the Government maintains its position that there is a “basis in fact” for holding that petitioner is “not opposed to war in any form”, but only selectively opposed to certain wars.
·         The question of whether or not the tests were complied with, however, becomes irrelevant in light of the fact that no reasons were ever given to the petition for the denial of his application, as a result of which, it could not be determined which of the three grounds was relied on in order to deny his application.


Saturday, March 15, 2014

[Digest] US CASE - Bradwell vs. Illinois (1873)

Bradwell v. State of Illinois (1873)
Mr. Justice Miller


Facts: Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied for a license to practice law in Illinois.  A state statute required a license obtained from two justices of the state supreme court to practice law. The Illinois Supreme Court denied her admission and held that as a married woman, she would not be bound in her contracts. The state supreme court’s opinion also held that the legislature never intended that women be admitted to the bar.

Issue: Can a qualified female citizen claim under the fourteenth amendment the privilege of practicing law?

Held: No. Judgment affirmed.

Ruling: The fourteenth amendment declares that citizens of the United States are citizens of the state where they reside. The protection designed by that clause has no application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of. If the plaintiff was a citizen of the state of Illinois, that provision of the Constitution gave her no protection against its courts or its legislation.

There are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, which a state is forbidden to abridge, but the right to admission to practice in the courts of a state is not one of them. This right does not depend on citizenship of the United States. As to the courts of a state, the right would relate to citizenship of the state. As to federal courts, it would relate to citizenship of the United States.

The right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a state is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to the federal government. Its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license.